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Abstract
We formulate performance assessment as a problem of causal analysis
and outline an approach based on the missing data principle for its solu-
tion. It is particularly relevant in the context of so-called league tables
for educational, health-care and other public-service institutions. The pro-
posed solution avoids comparisons of institutions that have substantially
diﬀerent clientele (intake).
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1Performance assessment and formation of league tables of public-service in-
stitutions have, over the last few years, become important statistical activities,
as documented by the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A (Smith,
1990; Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 1996; Deeley and Smith, 1998; Spiegelhalter,
1999; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002; Stone, 2002; Bailey and Hewson, 2004; Bird,
2004; Bratti et al., 2004; Draper and Gittoes, 2004; Bird et al., 2005; and Smith
and Street, 2005). Target setting is a focus of the UK Government Depart-
ments responsible for the performance of these institutions, and satisfying the
targets, improving the ranking and securing a better assessment appear to be
imperatives for the institutions’ senior management teams. These management
goals often compete for resources with the aspects of clinical priorities that are
not represented among the targets. Discussion of the target setting ‘culture’
featured in the 2005 electoral campaign in the UK, and the jury is still out on
whether and how the culture contributed to the outbreak of methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections and other public service calamities
and controversies in the UK.
Publication of the league tables of the UK universities, National Health Ser-
vice Trusts, local authorities, railway companies and the like, is by now a well
established regularly occurring event. On the one hand, the desire for trans-
parency motivates publication of league tables, perceived as a comprehensive
way of comparing institutions of a similar kind in an easy-to-understand for-
mat. On the other hand, the statistics community generally recognises, but
often does not argue persuasively, that such an ordered list, being subject to
uncertainty, is misleading. A sign of ultimate admission of this is the acknowl-
edgement that the assessment (e.g., the assigned position in a league table) is
more important than the (latent, imperfectly observed) performance. A natural
progression of this state of aﬀairs is that institutions will concentrate more and
more on improving the (manifest) assessment, while ignoring improvements in
2their (latent) performance. Measured assessment is generally easier to improve
than actual performance, especially in the short term. As a result, some in-
stitutions may be rated higher and higher, but the quality of the service they
provide could well stagnate.
Secondary schools in the UK are probably a case in point. They have become
very successful (on average) in generating General Certiﬁcates of Secondary Ed-
ucation (GCSE), and it is widely accepted that that is what matters. Careful
matching of students with subjects they study and alteration of the curricula
to match the contents of examinations are bound to be important factors, com-
peting with the ideal of equal opportunity, in which all students learn as much
as their interests and capacities permit. Learning and skills acquired no longer
count unless they come with a GCSE!
We want to discuss another deﬁciency of the league tables, namely that
they neither compare nor even attempt to compare ‘like with like’. For illus-
tration, we consider a performance assessment of schools or universities based
on their students’ outcomes. In our interpretation of ‘like with like’, compar-
ing two schools makes sense only when many students who attended one could
conceivably have attended the other. In most of the statistical literature on
performance assessment, this issue is addressed by adjustment, typically using
linear regression. Such modelling is burdened by numerous caveats related to
the distributional assumptions and the functional form assumed for the (mul-
tilevel) regression. More thorough search among the models may reward the
analyst with a better ﬁtting model but, when model uncertainty is ignored, the
relevant selected-model-based estimators are neither unbiased, nor eﬃcient, and
their precision is often grossly overestimated (Longford, 2005a).
The Rubin’s causal model (Holland, 1986) bypasses several of these deﬁcien-
cies and recognises the principal source of diﬃculty — non-ignorable allocation
of units (students) to treatments (schools); see Rubin (1978, 1991 and 2005)
3and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Each student is associated with a potential
outcome for every school that he or she could conceivably have attended. Of
these, only one outcome is observed for every student, for the school attended.
Thus, the data have the form (W,Z,Y), where W indicates the school attended,




outcomes for the schools s = 1,...,S. For classical statistical inference, the
values of Z and Y are ﬁxed, and randomness rests solely with W, assuming
that in a replication of the reality students would attend diﬀerent schools, but
their outcomes in these schools are ‘hard-coded’, waiting to be revealed if the
student attends that school. The background variables Z should be selected so
as to ensure, or make palatable, the assumption that the assignment of students
to schools, W, is ignorable; that it does not depend on the potential outcomes
after conditioning on Z:
(W |Z,Y) ∼ (W |Z), (1)
for the corresponding conditional distributions.
Students with some backgrounds would never contemplate attending certain
schools — students with such backgrounds do not occur in these schools. We
can reﬂect this is our set-up by declaring Y
(s)
j as undeﬁned for all implausible
combinations of students j and schools s.
In the standard missing-data formulation, we regard the enumeration of the
variables (W,Z,Y) as the complete data, and the incomplete data comprise
completely recorded W and Z, but only YW instead of Y. Relying on the
assignment process being ignorable, (1), the values of Y can be completed by
one of several (multiple) imputation methods (Rubin, 2004; Longford 2005b),
such as hot-deck (matching on the background Z) and propensity matching. A
key principle in this process is that the method should not be informed in any
way by the (observed or unobserved) values of the outcomes Y.
4Any two schools s1 and s2 could be compared straightforwardly, by the
values of their summaries T (such as the means) of their potential outcomes,
restricted to the students attending one of the schools, T(Ys1 |W = s1) and
T(Ys2 |W = s1), if these outcomes were observed completely and were deﬁned.
If the complete-data comparison cannot be evaluated because some values Y
(s)
j
are not deﬁned, the comparison cannot and should not be made. When a few
values of Y (s2) are not deﬁned, we may resort to some compromise, such as
reducing the summary T to students whose potential outcomes are deﬁned and
comparisons of pairs of schools to those students who could attend either school
in the pair.
Because hardly any student would seriously contemplate enrolment at Ox-
ford University and a ‘new’ UK university with a mainly vocational orientation
as equal alternatives, this device would preclude any comparison of all the UK
universities. This may lead to ‘indirect’ comparisons, when universities A and
C are not comparable, but both pairs (A,B) and (B,C) are, or even to more
complicated linking, and to ﬁnding contradictions with transitivity.
We propose to address this problem by caliper matching, in which each school
is associated with 2K of its closest ‘rivals’, and its assessment is restricted to
a comparison of these 2K + 1 institutions. For example, an ordering of the
schools may be deﬁned according to the academic quality of their students’
backgrounds, and for the school in position h, the schools in positions h − K,
h − K + 1,...,h − 1,h + 1,...,h + K are declared as its rivals. As the focal
school is in the middle of its rivals, the comparisons can (but do not have to)
be made using elementary complete-data methods, supplemented by multiple
imputation for the unobserved potential outcomes. The uncertainty about the
comparisons can be estimated by the between-imputation variance. (There is no
within-imputation variance because the complete-data analysis is without any
variation.) The size of the caliper, 2K + 1, should be set so that there would
5be very few undeﬁned values Y
(s)
j for schools s and students j in any set of 2K
rival schools; each of these sets of schools would be nearly exchangeable. Very
small K, K = 1 or 2, should be avoided because too little comparing would take
place.
The rank of a school A is estimated with reference to its rivals, and so it
can be compared with the rank of another school B only when A and B have
most of their respective sets of 2K rivals in common. Thus the rank, or another
summary, reﬂects the school’s position among its genuine competitors. The
uncertainty about the summary can be represented by the empirical distribu-
tion of the summary evaluated on many replicate (multiply imputed) completed
datasets. Conﬁdence intervals can be derived from this distribution straightfor-
wardly.
A virtue of this approach is that it implies a clear and meaningful goal
for every institution: to do the best with their input (students’ backgrounds).
Inﬂuencing (manipulating) the input in any way does not have predictable con-
sequences on the assessment of any given school. The comparisons do not use
any regression to which schools and students with very diﬀerent (background)
proﬁles contribute, and all the details of the method are set without inspecting
the outcomes, unlike in model selection. The approach requires background
information, just like regression, but it uses it only locally, focussing on the
ranges of values that occur in the sets of compared (comparable) institutions.
We think that this is a far more principled and defensible approach than the
current ones.
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